Conflict in the Middle East has opened a debate on the possibility of a change in the regional order that has existed for the past 50 years. These changes may affect the regional role of Russia, which has been working hard to reestablish itself as a great power: starting with its intervention in the Syrian civil war, since when Iran has remained a key regional ally on whom Russia’s influence and power in the region closely depends. A year after the start of the Gaza war, it remains unclear which power bloc in the region will prevail: whether Israel, supported by the US and some EU member states, will emerge stronger and as a result weaken Iran’s strength in the region and consequently its place worldwide; or whether the conflict will ultimately damage Israel and discourage outside support, enabling other players including Iran to establish a firm hold.
If Iran lost its influence (or it were much diminished), this would challenge Russia’s standing, established since 2015. Wars in Gaza and Lebanon may also test these relations. The Kremlin is thought to have no intention of abandoning Iran despite the pressure it is under through its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah: the commitment to continued cooperation and development stands.
Russia itself has been affected by the war: the success of Israeli missile strikes on Iran damaged the reputation of the Russian arms industry. In fact, Russia provided no support for Iran’s air defense and declined to condemn Israel’s attacks. This perceived betrayal has resulted in unprecedented anti-Russian sentiment across Iran among parliament members, the Foreign Ministry, and ordinary Iranians.
It is also unclear to what extent the war will challenge the role of Russia in the region when it is heavily occupied with the conflict in Ukraine. It has been less active than its rivals in the West, who Russia and Iran aim to challenge. The need to deploy its own military equipment and facilities in the Middle East has also made it more difficult for Iran to support Russia in Ukraine. The Ukraine war, I would argue, complex and troubling as it is, was a golden opportunity for Russia to build closer relations with Middle Eastern partners, as the region has in recent years been experiencing challenging relations with the West.
Regional powers are key partners in energy deals with Russia: OPEC+ agreements since the Ukraine war have contributed to Russia’s growing presence in the region through its “economic statecraft” of essentially weaponizing energy. The emerging challenge of reshaping the balance of the power in the Middle East and the return of the focus of regional powers to regional dynamics and security has stymied some of this progress. However, Russia may indeed remain crucial for regional actors, diplomatically and economically. Though far from certain, it seems that the vacuum of power created by Western withdrawals might have been Russia’s to fill, but a visible lack of diplomatic energy and clear policies toward the Gaza and Lebanon wars may be seen as an opportunity missed.
For example, the president of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, met Joe Biden in the White House in September, three days before Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut. The two leaders discussed ways to end the conflicts in the Middle East. A month later Sheikh Mohammed visited Moscow, but his discussions with Vladimir Putin focused on economic statecraft and mutual investments. Thus, neither the Emiratis side nor anyone else is relying on Russia to address the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. Rather, they consider the US — which heavily supports Israel — as the key player, and understand that if the balance of power shifts, it may do so toward the West.
With a US presidential election next week, the matter of choosing sides might become another challenge for Russia’s place in the region: Donald Trump’s 2017-2021 presidency contributed to close ties with the Gulf monarchies and the Abraham Accords with Israel. This could be another alarming history to remember while discussing Russia’s future standing in the region. Thus, the Middle East is in transformation, affecting the balance of regional powers, the great power balance, and the positions of worldwide players including Russia. Russia has an important existing role in the region, but there are alarm bells that, occupied with its own war in Ukraine, Moscow is putting less effort into resolving issues and establishing its place in shaping the balance of regional powers. In analyses of Russian officials’ discourses, the focus has been on the possibility of a Third World War as an outcome of the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. However, none has a suggested a clear strategy in case Iran’s influence collapses, how Russia could balance its focus over the Ukraine war, or any strategy to balance the US role in recent events. I believe Russia must reshape its focus from a “wars” mentality (always waiting for a nuclear war, Third World War, etc.) and instead consider all developments in the region as they occur, working out how to take advantage of events. It also needs a clear strategy for the short, middle and long term in case of a completely reshaped balance of power in the Middle East. The next 50 years there could prove as crucial and complex as the past 50.
