From Omar H Rahman
Egypt’s proposal for the reconstruction and administration of Gaza has emerged as an urgent intervention in the crisis that has unfolded since October 7, 2023. Backed by the Arab states, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and several European nations, the plan is not merely a humanitarian initiative — it is a geopolitical manoeuvre meant to counter the scheme being pushed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and recently backed by United States President Donald Trump, to depopulate the Gaza Strip.
For several months, Arab states hesitated to step into the role of rebuilding and governing Gaza without a comprehensive initiative to address the core issue of Palestinian statelessness. Effectively, they were resisting being drawn into the role of a Palestinian Authority (PA) 2.0, shouldering Israel’s responsibilities as an occupying force while Israelis continued their colonial expansion in the West Bank. Yet, the existential threat posed by Trump and Netanyahu’s vision for Gaza has forced them into action.
At its core, Egypt’s $53bn reconstruction plan relies on the establishment of a local steering committee composed of technocrats for the first six months, with a transition to PA control thereafter. But this approach carries fundamental problems that could doom the plan to failure before it is even implemented.
The Israeli prime minister has been clear in his opposition to any role for the PA in Gaza. His stance is strategic: allowing the PA to administer the territory would open the door for geopolitical unity between Gaza and the West Bank, a stepping stone to renew negotiations for a Palestinian state.
For decades, Netanyahu and Israel’s political establishment have worked to prevent any scenario that could lead to Palestinian self-determination. The status quo of fragmentation and division between Palestinian territories serves their interests, keeping the goal of statehood perpetually out of reach.
To effectively counter Netanyahu, the Arab states need the buy-in of as many other actors as possible, especially the Trump administration, which has the leverage to force the Israeli premier to accept.
While Netanyahu may still seek to undermine its implementation through imposing bureaucratic hurdles, military escalations, or economic restrictions — part of a well-worn Israeli playbook — the Arab plan remains the best option on the table to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Gaza through renewed warfare and long-term deprivation.
Beyond Israeli resistance, there is another major barrier to implementing the Arab plan: the PA. Under President Mahmoud Abbas, it is a deeply unpopular institution, lacking political relevance after the collapse of the Oslo Accords.
Over the years, Abbas has accelerated the erosion of its legitimacy by continuing security coordination with Israel, deepening his authoritarian rule, and refusing to hold elections since 2006. His leadership has been increasingly defined by repression — of opposition factions, of political renewal, and of any resistance to Israeli aggression.
Without a viable political process, the PA has become an appendage of Israel’s occupation and apartheid, enforcing security in the West Bank while lacking any real authority to govern as an independent entity. This has fuelled widespread Palestinian disillusionment. Abbas’s grip on power has necessitated an increasingly heavy hand, particularly against activists and factions calling for a more confrontational approach to Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing.
The PA’s failure has been especially glaring in the past 16 months of Israel’s genocidal assaults on Gaza and the West Bank. Abbas has been largely absent from efforts to mobilise Palestinian resistance, his silence and inaction reflecting his obsolescence.
His government has not only lost the confidence of the Palestinian people but has also become largely irrelevant to the broader geopolitical players, including Israel, the US, and Arab states.
Abbas’s reliance on Israel and the PA’s international donors to keep the authority afloat forces him to prioritise their demands over those of his people, which largely run contrary to each other. As his domestic popularity has subsequently plummeted, his authoritarianism has become more severe.
Most recently, he initiated a crackdown on Palestinian resistance groups in the northern West Bank city of Jenin and eliminated financial support for families of Palestinians imprisoned, killed, or wounded by Israel.
This move, breaking a longstanding social compact between the Palestinian people and their leadership, has only underscored the extent to which the PA seeks to appease Israel and the West at the expense of legitimacy at home. Now, faced with an urgent need for Palestinian governance in Gaza, the Arab states find themselves without a real, viable partner. The existing PA leadership is weak, corrupt, and likely incapable of administering the Strip effectively.
Some within the Arab world, as well as Palestinian civil society and the diaspora, are pushing for new leadership. However, Abbas and his loyalists have resisted any such efforts. In mid-February, the PA prevented 33 delegates to a Palestinian national conference being held in Doha — which was billed as a grassroots effort to revive the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) — from leaving the West Bank. –FP
