The truth is that the ‘new year’ has no astronomical significance attached to it. None. It merely marks and celebrates an arbitrary point on the Earth’s elliptical journey around the Sun; a journey that neither started on January 1, nor experiences a revival on the said date.
But despite its astronomical insignificance, humanity uses the ‘new year’ as an opportunity to reflect on the developments of the past 12 months, and plan for a fresh start for the coming orbit of Earth around the Sun.
The most significant development of 2021, by a large margin, was the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, and the end of American occupation in Afghanistan. But that’s just a statement of the immediate and the transitory. As we get past the immediate pulse of this development, a far more significant question will need to be answered: what does America’s ignominious defeat in Afghanistan mean for the international “rules-based order”, which derives its legitimacy from American power?
The United Nations defines the international ‘rules-based order’ as “a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in accordance with agreed rules that evolve over time, such as international law, regional security arrangements, trade agreements, immigration protocols, and cultural arrangements.” Notwithstanding the soft and inclusive language of this definition, in essence, the international rules-based order requires all countries to abide by a set of rules created by the United States and her select partners. And any country that does not tow the American line—like Cuba, Iraq, Iran, or Syria—is slapped with economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and (eventual) military action. In effect, the international rules-based order is America’s stick and carrot mechanism for governing the world.
While this system is ostensible packaged in the language of human rights and global collaborations, at its core, the enforceability of the international ‘rules-based order’ is based on a series of coercive assumptions, that include: 1) countries will abide by the dictates of the international rules-based order, over and above any bilateral relations that such countries may wish to have inter se; 2) violation of this system will definitively result in economic and diplomatic sanctions—including pressure from international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and FATF, etc.; 3) the sanctions imposed, by the United States and international institutions, for violating this system, will be enough to coerce a party into abiding by the rules-based order; 4) participants of the international rules-based order will be willing to employ decisive military force, through various multilateral forums (e.g. UNSC and NATO), to enforce the system; and 5) the United States has the military muscle to enforce this system, unilaterally, if required.
Without these assumptions, the international rules-based order would be a mere catchphrase; with no real persuasion, potency or legitimacy.
Consequently, as we welcome the new year, and look past the defeat of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, it is pertinent to assess whether the international rules-based order can continue to serve as the currency of power. Or whether, in 2022 and beyond, the assumptions that lend legitimacy to this system no longer hold.
First—that individual countries will abide by the dictates of the international rules-based order, over and above bilateral interests.
