Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will arrive in Ukraine on Friday following a two-day trip to Poland commemorating the 70th anniversary of Indo-Polish bilateral ties. But while Modi’s visit could be seen as a gesture of support for Kyiv as it defends against invading Russian forces, it’s worth remembering that he visited Moscow in early July after being re-elected for a third term – a move widely seen as him thumbing his nose at the free world. His bear-hug embrace of President Vladimir Putin, even as the largest children’s hospital in Kyiv was under attack, was described by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as “a huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts.”
Interestingly, Modi is traveling to Kyiv not as a mediator but as a messenger. His “perspective-sharing” agenda is being telegraphed to tamper expectations among Western allies who have urged India to use its cordial relationship with Russia to help end the conflict.
Besides his high-wire, Orban-esque shuttle diplomacy making waves domestically, Modi is trying to come across as even-handed by showing up on the territory of both warring sides within a matter of months. That said, the 20-hour train journey he is set to embark on suggests that his meeting with Zelensky is not solely about optics.
Whether by design or unwittingly, India, the world’s largest democracy, remains one of the key enablers of Putin’s “special military operation.” Despite reducing its dependence on Russian-made artillery – which now accounts for 36% of its total arms imports, down from 65% before 2020 – India shows little interest in disrupting its purchase of discounted Russian hydrocarbons.
In fiscal year 2023, India became the second-largest consumer of Russian fossil fuels, spending $37 billion on crude oil – roughly 13 times its pre-war expenditure. And last month, India surpassed China as the top importer of Russian oil, Reuters reported.
India has also doubled its diamond purchases from Russia in the first quarter of 2024, openly defying the United States and the European Union. Admittedly, middle powers like India have been afforded significant leeway to navigate between the Western bloc and the Eurasian nexus under the guise of “strategic autonomy.” Putin, in pursuing his vision for a “new world order,” is keen to deepen the partnership between Moscow and New Delhi beyond the latter’s defense and energy needs. However, Russia has little to offer its “dear friend” other than heavily discounted commodities and subpar weaponry.
Having joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in mid-2017 at Russia’s behest, India is beginning to question what benefit it has gained from full-fledged membership in the regional bloc. Modi’s no-show at the 24th SCO summit in Astana this summer speaks volumes about his disillusionment with the Sino-led group that includes arch-rival Pakistan.
